INTRODUCTION
This article builds upon Yasemin Soysal's 1 early work on postnational citizenship as constituting sites of resistance in contemporary European politics. Postnational citizenship provides every person with the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical ties to that community. This celebration of human rights as a world-level organizing principle is, however, constantly challenged by liberal discourses and practices aimed to securitise identities and citizenships through the bordering of space, place and identities. Proceeding from a critical take on securitisation we propose that in addition to a focus on the exceptional and on elite speech acts, we need to recognize that it is through everyday practices that people engage in (de)securitising strategies and practices that both rely upon and contest notions of belonging and borders. To what extent are those at the margins of citizenship able to resist securitising practices aimed at limiting their presence and rights and how do these actors reproduce securitising practices that distinguish them from other groups? How can such claims be understood in terms of desecuritisation processes and what are the socio-psychological dynamics behind such resisting practices?
Building upon our previous work, we exemplify by looking at two (diverse) minority communities in Britain and Canada that have been securitised at transnational, national and local levels, and study the extent to which we can see evidence of everyday resistance through the explicit or implicit use of desecuritising strategies. In both settings, the communities we study are young Muslims. These communities have been chosen in order to outline different kinds of securitising practices affecting people who, while sharing a common ethno-religious characteristic are situated in countries with distinctive histories of immigration and citizenship regimes. As we shall see, despite the distinctive character of the Canadian regime, notably its policy of multiculturalism and its political culture of polyethnic diversity, the range of (de)securitising citizenship strategies finds patterns of both commonality and distinctiveness between the two national settings. In both the Canadian and the British settings, we are concerned with the narratives surrounding these communities and the particular forms of governance structures affecting their ability to act as citizens as well as the bordering practices they engage in. The empirical study is based on our interviews, reports and media transcripts 2 .
The aim is not to provide a full-fledged analysis of all aspects of citizenship and the specific opportunities and hindrances affecting these groups, but rather to provide an illustrative study of the relationship between governance, narratives, borders and (de)securitisation to show the increasing difficulties postnational citizenship is facing in a global context.
We start by outlining the connection between citizenship and sovereignty. Here we delineate the theoretical debates surrounding these issues with a particular emphasis on the crisis of postnational citizenship in a world governed by security. Empirically the focus is on how the current world order can be interpreted in terms of exceptional politics and how this exerts an impact on the governance of subjectivities and behaviour. We argue that such practices exist within re-invented master narratives that aim to reify borders, manifest in clear boundaries which act as co-constructors of individuals' and groups' self-identity in relation to significant others.
Second, we proceed to a discussion of how this process involves securitising moves in relation to sovereign bodies, moves that are related to the naturalisation of borders and the narrativisation of boundaries. This involves a critical reading of much current security literature in an effort to clarify how securitisation must be viewed in co-constitutive terms in which individual agency and the narrative construction of boundaries play an important part. Third, we discuss how bringing individuals and emotions into the picture can help us in conceptualising a politics of resistance and desecuritisation. Relying on Bakhtin's and Markova's concept of dialogism and
Agamben's discussion of subjectification and resistance we sketch a possible politics of resistance in response to the governing of subjectivity and the regulation of behaviour through narrative means. Finally, we provide empirical examples of both securitising and desecuritising practices by relating the theoretical discussion to our study of young Muslims in Britain and Canada. We conclude by drawing some general inferences from this illustrative study.
CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY

Events occurring at a global level have local repercussions, not least in terms of how citizenship
is conceptualised and sometimes changed. Traditionally citizenship has been used to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, where citizenship is attached to people because of their belonging to a state jurisdiction. This implies that rights are principally connected to citizenship, rather than being universally defined and enforced 3 . International legal human rights structures are of course built upon universal rights of people, but as Covenants they are ascribed to and enforced through an international state system which tends to exclude those considered noncitizens from the discourse 4 Soysal's notion of postnational citizenship relies on the fact that nationality is no longer a precondition for the enjoyment of rights and is therefore seen as less important by individual immigrants. This banalisation of citizenship was associated with two distinct developments in the 1980s and 1990s, that of a move towards conditional jus soli, dual nationality, shorter waiting periods and less administrative discretion followed by recognition that citizenship should be more accessible and less tied to ethno-national membership or loyalty. The other had to do with the lesser difference citizenship made to the guest workers of the 1980s as they largely enjoyed the same social rights as majority community members 14 . As Mouritsen argues, however, this may no longer be the case. "In essence, the post-national ease of access, lack of differences between permanent residence and naturalization, and lack of pathos from states and individuals alike all comes down to the fact that the only remaining prize of 'thin' neo-liberal membership is the right to access national labour markets" 15 .
Such developments have prompted the argument that a post-9/11 world defined by security and terror discourses is characterised by a recoupling, rather than a decoupling, of citizenship and nationality 16 . Instructively, Didier Bigo has described this process as a shift in governmentality -a shift from the panoptical to the banoptical -in which the banopticon is defined as a regime of practices where specific groups are blamed already before they have done anything, "simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual pertaining to the risk category" 32 .
This form of governmentality of unease, or Ban, is the work of biometric borders that redefine external and internal security. It relies on exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility 33 . Such practices exist within re-invented master narratives that aim to reify an object that is in fact plurilocal and manifest it in clear boundaries. They are mutually related and form political identities and act as co-constructors of individuals' and groups' self-identity in relation to significant others.
NARRATIVES, BORDERS AND SECURITY
Foucault argued for a form of critical social analysis focused on events, moments when an existing regime of practices is "reinvested, co-opted and redeployed by new social forces and governmental rationalities" 34 .
In accordance with such rationalities, Louise Amoore states that "immigration and the terrorist threat became combined as a problem 'not because there is a threat to the survival of society' but because 'scenes from everyday lives are politicized, because day-to-day living is securitized'"
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. This securitisation of day-to-day lives is likely to focus on restoring a sense of community, security and order 36 , but in so doing the very exclusions and prejudices that initiate conflict are often reconstituted. This can be seen in the development of a European visa system which increasingly replaces the national passport as a token of trust and as an original source of inclusion and exclusion 37 . It can be further seen in recent changes to border security and immigration law and regulations in Canada 38 . In line with van Munster, this could imply a reinterpretation of Agamben's state of exception to describe the dominant paradigm, or narrative, of governing modern societies. "In this view the state of exception is not so much a temporary, exceptional measure but a technique of government that relies on security" 39 .
Such securitising moves involve narratives that inscribe a hegemonic set of cultural values upon territories and populations in order to control, know and domesticate certain groups of people residing in national space, even in cases when these individuals have formal citizenship rights. Young urban post-diasporic (second and subsequent generations) Muslim men are being particularly framed as security threats in such stories 40 . In some cases they may even emerge as the bare life -"the in-between forms of life, uncoded substances without fixed belongings, unprotected by 'their' states" /…/ "that is, a form of human life upon which the sovereignty of states, of ethnic/religious communities and local strongmen can be performed and 'natured'" 41 .
This implies that the state is not the only centre and origin of sovereignty. Rather, the state is constantly confronted by other forms of sovereign bodies which attempt to insert control over the governed subject. Thus, the very invocation and attempted reassertion of borders, sovereign powers, and state apparatuses is evidence of bids for securitisation, not merely on the part of majorities, but also minorities. Within Europe, for instance, we have seen how Muslim and other minority communities are repeatedly framed in terms of security threats as migration is perceived as threatening to the self-identity of the majority society. In return, there is evidence of the closing down of available options to many Muslim minority community members. Also in Canada there have been attempts to import such a framing of Muslims and other minorities into Canadian discourse 42 and Canadian popular culture 43 . This is both reflected and amplified by recent regulatory and legal changes adopted by the Conservative government. In this context, the thrust of recent policy has been toward a pro-Monarchist, traditionalist and Protestant angloconformism combined with a marked pro-Israeli stance in Canadian foreign policy and a hardening of regulations regarding borders and immigration. Despite the underlying continued support for positive integration and multiculturalism in Canadian political culture 44 , it is apparent that discourses of securitisation have increasingly come to vie with those of desecuritisation.
That security is not only about state security was a theme developed early on by the socalled Copenhagen School (headed by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan) with its focus on societal security and securitisation as a discursive practice 45 . The Copenhagen school thus started a process in which security studies began developing a different vocabulary than that of classical international relations approaches to security, including a focus on the politics of risk 46 and the politics of fear 47 , often described as "an age of anxiety" 48 ; the "governmentality of unease" 49 , and "ontological (in)security" 50 . Empirically many of these accounts have been related to September 11 and its aftermath, but they have also been concerned with a more general unease in terms of changed mobilities and the crisis of the state. Such contentions have rested on the idea of porous border in which governments can no longer control the flow of currencies, labour or commodities, information or unwanted aliens. Much of the discourse has focused on the unassimilable migrant workers, but it has also been preoccupied with other external threats such as the French reaction against US cultural products, the concern that the opening of the Channel Tunnel would open England to rabies, that the Euro would threaten the sterling or that legal sovereignty would be endangered by European courts 51 . Theoretically these concerns have often focused on power relations in order to better understand the meaning and construction of borders and boundaries.
The fact that borders are politically constructed means that they have to find their legitimacy in boundaries, i.e. the cultural and political narratives about a society, its culture, territory and history; about who is member of that society and, consequentially, who is an outsider. In this sense, we distinguish between borders, understood as the institutionalized phenomena, established in legal texts as territorial and spatio-temporal demarcations and boundaries, the narratives constructed to give or challenge the meaning of borders. This distinction in often implicit in the literature on borders, where institutional and narrative or discursive demarcation of borders is considered to be part of the same process. Instead, we see them as separated, albeit interrelated processes 52 . As narratives, boundaries refer to a description of the fundamental events in their natural logical and chronological order 53 . Through their symbolic power they can become part of what Eder 54 calls the "hardness of borders" as they help to "naturalise" hard borders in the sense of taking borders for granted. Crucially, they have an ontological dimension 55 . Narratives about the boundaries of a community are used by actors to make sense of who they are in relation to contrasting out-groups 56 . A narrative approach to boundaries embraces a principle of mind in action, which implies that the construction of boundaries is not a passive endeavour, but one in which narratives mediate social practice. Hence the notion of narrative engagement is important as it suggests that individuals navigate a polyphonic context in which multiple storylines circulate and compete for dominance in individual appropriation 57 . This notion is crucial, as we shall see below, if we are to fully appreciate resistance and desecuritising moves. It also complicates some of the contemporary readings of security practices and their emphasis on speech acts, top-down governance and exceptional politics. In addition it provides a much needed socio-psychological perspective to this literature.
BANAL SECURITISATION -SECURITISING THE EVERYDAY
Attempts to naturalise borders and define the boundaries of communities may seem to imply only purposeful action on behalf of politicians (and/or community leaders) in order to manipulate individual and group sentiments to realise political objectives. In this sense it clearly involves the development of a state of exception in line with the ideas developed by Agamben and others 58 , including attempts to govern subjectivities and regulate behaviour. However, the securitisation of borders is not simply about manipulating and mobilising opinion but also describes the process through which individuals and groups struggle to cope with uncertainty and insecurity/ies. This mode of powerlessness and anxiety clearly predates September 11, but it has also created a foundation for emerging responses to this event, and others like it; as such responses have thrived on the sensibility of vulnerability.
Many of the beliefs that shape the current response to terrorism -the idea that humanity This involves a search for ontological security which becomes a spatial as well as a psychological dynamic to do with a generalized sense of insecurity, danger and threat and the longing for secure boundaries. As Noble 65 has noted in regard to a post-9/11 world, the experience of increasing racism and otherness, "undermine the ability of migrants to feel 'at home' and hence their capacity to exist as citizens". In this sense both bordering and boundary practices have a psychological dimension. They fulfil an imaginary protection, at times manifest in fetishism for "pure" identities, and thus co-constitute the governing of subjectivities and behaviour. Any attempts to break this socio-psychological dynamic must take into account not only structural securitising moves justified through a politics of exception and fear, but also the vulnerabilities that make such a politics possible. If, as Claudia Aradau has argued, "securitization orders social relations according to the logic of political realism and institutionalizes an exceptionalism of speed, extraordinary measures and friend/enemy", then desecuritisation needs to become a "normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic politics where the struggle for emancipation is possible" 66 . Hence, we must think of emancipation in terms of bottom-up approaches allowing for subjectification and reappropriation of alternative narratives that can resist and subvert hegemonic dominance. At heart is the challenge to sovereign power from those at the margins of knowledge production -the return of the political -in the words of Jenny Edkins. "The protests reclaim memory and rewrite it as a form of resistance" 67 . Such resistance is psychological as well as structural, and is grounded in an emotional basis of defiance and anger that can reframe hegemonic boundaries.
One main component of Agamben's thought is his conception of the subject as an interval or remainder between what he refers to as processes of subjectification and desubjectification 68 .
If we see the current world order in terms of a state of exception, as a suspension of a juridical order, then the task is to make the law ineffective by creating a new form of subject that is neither self nor other. Agamben uses the term profanation, meaning to violate or transgress, as well as play, as a useful term for a process in which something new is created through a novel use of old "things". The intention is to use the internal logic inherent in a state of exception to subvert its outcomes. This new thing can avoid the sovereign capture.
"(W)hat the state cannot tolerate in any way … is that the singularities form a community, without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging" 69 . The issue at stake is thus to explore and invent the profane potential that resides within remnant forms of subjectification and de-subjectification produced by sovereign power To what extent do those at the margins of citizenship resist securitising practices aimed at limiting their presence and rights, and how far do they accomplish this without reproducing securitising practices that isolate them from other groups. In order to discuss this in the next section we outline securitisation in the British and Canadian contexts. In the subsequent section we give examples of how far these securitising practices have been resisted.. . The result has been "multiculturalism on one island" as Adrian Favell 80 puts it, where immigrant and ethnic minorities have been "nationalised" in relation to British social and political institutions. The 1999 Parekh report followed the logic of this race relations politics in its recommendation that the major political parties should seek to select ethnic minority candidates in seats where more than 25 per cent of the population is from ethnic minorities. As pointed out by Geddes 81 , the corollary of this logic would mean that "white people are best represented by other white people". Underlying this race-related logic is the implication that it is the minorities that should be concerned with their own representation rather than there being more general modes of representation. In this sense representation becomes a minority concern instead of a mainstream issue 82 .
GOVERNING SECURITIES: YOUNG MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN AND CANADA
In terms of Muslim minority communities, governance in a British context has thus taken the form of surveillance of suspect communities -a concept first used in relation to the IRA -in which the process of identification of a threat legitimates the politics of exception put in place by the state 83 . This can be exemplified in terms of how extremism, ideology, evil, and Islamism became intertwined in the narrative following the attacks in London on July 7, 2005, interspersed with the theme of barbarism as a term associated with the metaphorical struggle for civility. In the language of Tony Blair, this was evident in the divergence between the "terrorists", the A male in the group was beginning to express his agreement when the woman interjected loudly and turned to one of the authors, saying defiantly: "excuse me, but if you have very little knowledge about our religion…what our own rights…our relationship towards God -about God's rights that is on us -the more you try to practice your religion, the more they call you a fanatic. The more you try to become close to God, the more he will test you and of course that will make them mad". Her tone was declarative to the others in the room as she was attempting to establish control and in so doing was laying down categories of belonging, order, and propriety. "how did you get this job? What did you do? I mean, how did they treat you?....people just assumed they couldn't apply.
In her claims, the woman is confidently expressing an engaged and entitled claim to public space and to occupy the very centre of community life and public visibility. In so doing, she is also a self-defined social animator who gives the message that observant and visible Muslims should not be concerned at sharing in the commercial and cultural life that is shared in the banal exchanges of Saturday shopping. In so doing, she is urging her fellow Muslims to overcome what Lerner refers to as 'surplus powerlessness', the learned predisposition to retreat and stay quiescent owing to an unrealistic assessment that one's voice and presence will be ignored, belittled, or put down 90 . She is making the case that a radical desecuritisation of the self and the bold claim to a place in integrated and shared public space will be accepted by the majority. 
RESISTING SOVEREIGNTY -DESECURITISATION AS
Legal borders vs. Cultural boundaries
One of the most challenging of circumstances is for young Muslims to know that they have full legal entitlement as citizens and yet to experience a social distance from the national cultures that they inhabit. In Canada, the social exclusion is subtle. A female social sciences student of Eritrean background says: "...Canada claims to be so multicultural and accepting, but under their breath, but really when you ask them, they will only accept what they want to accept, for instance to food, but not beliefs. I think they're threatened by our religion".
A commonly held complaint among the British students is expressed by a female student in Bradford MSA focus group: "You've got to understand people saying 'integrate' and at the same time shutting the doors in your face...."
A Canadian female lawyer discusses reactions on the part of broader society to Muslim
Canadians expressing an assertive voice in the public sphere. Her point is very similar to that of the British student, arguing effectively that Muslims are criticised if they do not occupy public space, but suspected if they actually take the public sphere seriously:
...it's not this person is exercising their right, it's this person is trying to impress upon Canadian society their views, trying to take over, trying to undermine Canadian values, even though this person is using the political process, is using the means that there are, that they are entitled to use. I feel that sometimes it's viewed with a little more suspicion than if they weren't Muslim.
The results of these distinctions are to alienate some Muslims. A Canadian woman student of Indian origin describes herself as "a citizen of the world". Thus, resistance to rebordering practices may take the form of cultural and political voice against those who have attempted to instantiate new cultural boundaries. It may also take the form of cognitive or literal exit to a more cosmopolitan, or at least better integrated, world.
Strategic integration and bodily plurilocation
For those who are gradually experiencing themselves and those they love being displaced into a series of external locations -as refugee claimants, smuggled humans, visa applicants, caged occupants of remote holding camps, homo sacer, economic migrants or citizens of convenience from elsewhere trying to take advantage of "our" generosity, there is a tendency to respond through evasion, ambiguity or pluriform existence. A female student of Iraqi background in Canada:
More than ever I think we...need to integrate ourselves. I always say not integrate completely because we do have our values and we do have our cultural norms that we hold very dear. And not assimilate completely, but also not isolate completely and hold ourselves into our own private pockets and not give to Canadians. But have a middle ground of integration -kind of a give and take -and not just get involved in political issues that affect us as Muslims, but also...we need to get out there and to give to a country that has given so much to us....let's come to a middle ground consensus so that we can live as Canadian Muslims."
In a written submission, a Canadian male science student expresses surprise in the discovery of invite his student to occupy the ground in which she is located, to make it home.
In each of these instances, there is active resistance to banal securitisation. In both a psychic and a somatic sense, these Muslims are playing with their spatio-temporal locales in a bid to craft subjects that refuse the dualism of 'self and other', either through being both or being neither.
Conclusions
In Given the global order, such exclusionary tendencies are evident even in Canada, where the history of colonisation, citizenship regime, and multicultural presence has been distinct.
Those who live within the cracks of the securitised order, who are designated other and outsider, or the enemy within, find themselves dislocated by the reconfigurations of borders that take place as regimes respond to uncertainty and threat. Through the agency of the dialogical self and profane acts of resistance, young Muslims demonstrate a capability to engage citizenship regimes in various ways, to adapt and to challenge through assertive remappings of social space.
Assertiveness through positive engagement entails working within evolving multicultures (for no matter elite claims that multiculturalism is a failure, multiculture is a lived reality) to dislocate, relocate, and plurilocate Muslim bodies in the face of regimes of (b)ordering that reconfigure disciplinary space and place. Building on the conviviality of dialogical interactions as well as the insistence of Muslim bodies in the public arena, banal acts of citizenship contribute to a remapping of the social landscape. So too do the profane refusals to colour within the lines that are constantly redrawn by securitised citizenship regimes and the insistence on creative ambiguity and multiplicity in the face of bureaucratic taxonomy and cultural endogamy.
